July 21, 2005
Securing mass transit
So once again Bush’s war is haunting the streets of London, thankfully with less deadly consequences than two weeks ago.
It’s also clear that this outcome was only a matter of luck. Although British security forces are still trying to figure out exactly what happened, one thing is already clear: the devices used were very similar to those that killed 56 people (including the bombers) on July 7, but were incorrectly primed and failed to explode.
Eyewitness reports describe one would-be bomber appearing confused as his detonator—but not the explosive itself—went off. The BBC reports that one terrorist tried to set off a device by firing shots at it from a handgun. Security forces say that the devices appear to be identical to those deployed on July 7.
The terrorists’ strategy was also similar. Their detonators went off simultaneously. The targets chosen—three subway trains and a bus—were a mirror image of July 7, even down to their north-south-east-west locations. (It’s widely assumed that the bomb that exploded on a bus on July 7 detonated prematurely, and was intended for a south central London location—perhaps Charing Cross station.)
In other words, London dodged another massacre only by chance—which leaves Blair and the British security forces in a very awkward position.
Since the attacks two weeks ago, Blair has constantly emphasized how security in London has been tightened. Yet what is now clear is that this had absolutely no impact on the ability of four terrorists to carry out an attack that was clearly intended to result in a high body-count. Blair over-promised: London, a crossroads for millions of bag-toting travelers each year, is close to unsecurable by conventional policing.
Blair should have known this, because we’ve been here before. For most of the 1970s and 1980s, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was able to bomb targets around (and beyond) London with impunity, precisely because it is such a seething thoroughfare. Even when the IRA left obvious clues—like parking a car-bomb the wrong way in a one-way street next to the landmark Harrods store—Londoners and security forces failed to notice. The 1983 Harrods bomb killed six and injured 80.
What’s clear is that the only way to reduce—but not eliminate—the chances of attacks on soft mass-transit targets is to make fundamental long-term changes in how high-risk areas are policed. I think Bill West at the Counterterrorism Blog has it right:
When it comes to our land transportation systems, it will be virtually impossible to implement controlled-access security systems like we have at airports. The intrusive and time-consuming security screening procedures that seemingly work at airports will never be tolerated nor would they be practical at commuter train stations where tens of thousands, and in some places hundreds of thousands of people pass through stations each day. Nor can we expect metal detectors and bomb sniffers to be placed at bus stops throughout cities around the country…at least not anytime soon.
Most major metropolitan areas with subway or other commuter rail systems have a transit police force for those train systems. Often, those transit police are also responsible for policing the public buses. Amtrak, the country’s national railroad corporation, even has its own police department.
A key component to enhancing the security of the Nation’s land transit systems will be to quite simply increase the manpower and training available to these transit police and security forces. The presence of uniformed armed police officers in train stations and bus terminals and aboard those trains, as well as plainclothes undercover officers conducting covert surveillance in the stations and aboard the trains and buses, makes for a powerful deterrent. The more such officers there are, and the better trained they are, especially if they are trained in behavioral profiling techniques like the Israeli security services have used for decades, the better protected these transportation systems will be. Having a lot of well-trained officers who know what and who they are looking for, with the authority to stop, question and when legally appropriate search people acting suspiciously, can make the difference.
Or, at least, make a difference, which would be a step in the right direction.
Posted by Stephen at 5:48 PM in Terrorism | Permalink | TrackBack (0)
Trackback Pings
TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.disinterestedparty.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-t.cgi/349
